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Abstract This article explores the role of sectarianism in the international rela-
tions of the Middle East. How has sectarianism altered the conduct of regional pol-
itics, and how has the regional states-system impacted on sectarianism? A frame-
work combining constructivism and realism is designed and deployed to analyse 
the enduring dual features (material power balance, identity contests) of the re-
gional states-system and then to dissect the interaction of sectarianism and the 
current regional power struggle.
This article explores the interaction between the surge of sectar-
ianism and regional politics in the Middle East. It poses the 
question: how and how much does sectarianism matter for con-
temporary regional international relations? It seeks less to 
explain the sectarianisation of the region than to ask how this 
– as manifest in the agency of actors constructing and instru-
mentalising sectarian worldviews – has affected the practices of 
the regional system and how the systemic structure – the realist 
rules of anarchic systems – alters (exacerbates or dilutes) sectar-
ianism’s impact.
The article begins by arguing that the topic requires a syn-
thesizing approach that links the role of ideational factors (such 
as identity, specifically sectarianism) with material structure 
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(specifically that of the regional system); and that this can be 
achieved by bringing together realist and constructivist ap-
proaches to international relations, each of which respectively 
focuses on one of these two factors. Following the outline of a 
combined constructivist–realist framework, the article exam-
ines the enduring two-sided features of Middle East regional 
politics – an inter-states system embedded in supra-state iden-
tities. It then analyses the interrelations between the Middle East 
regional power struggle and the sectarian surge following the 
Arab Uprisings starting in 2011. The conclusion summarises the 
findings regarding the interaction of material and ideational fac-
tors (and realist and constructivist analysis).
To prefigure the argument, the article shows how regional 
rivalries built into the states-system, and inflamed by the Arab 
Uprisings, led regimes to instrumentalise sectarianism in their 
power struggles, and specifically in their competitive interven-
tions in the civil wars that followed the Uprisings. This, in turn, 
rendered formerly recessive sectarian identities salient down to 
the grassroots level and drove a move towards the sectarian bi-
polarisation of the regional system. However, the insecurity 
thereby unleashed led all states to prioritise state security inter-
ests, overshadowing sectarian identities in the Sunni camp. The 
dynamics of an anarchic regional system trumped the power of 
sectarian identity.
Framework of analysis:  
towards a constructivist–realist synthesis
Sectarianism can usefully be understood as a version of identi-
ty, hence it can be framed by the debate as to whether and how 
identity counts in international relations. In the international re-
lations of the Middle East, the debate is mirrored in two classic 
texts: Steven Walt’s realist analysis, The Origin of Alliances (1987), 
and Michael Barnett’s constructivist work, Dialogues in Arab 
Politics (1998). While the dominant major theories, realism and 
constructivism, tend to emphasise either the material or the ide-
ational, each to the neglect of the other, analysts have increas-
ingly come to accept that both material and ideational forces 
such as identity matter (Sorensen 2008). Thus Barkin (2003), de-
ploring the false material–ideational dichotomy, argued for mar-
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rying realism and constructivism. Each offers indispensable in-
sights into the two factors that this article aims to address in ana-
lysing the current Middle East crisis: namely, the regional pow-
er struggle (realism) and identities, including sectarianism (con-
structivism).
For realism, it is material structure that matters most. The 
insecurity produced by the anarchy of states-systems drives 
power struggles in which states defend their national interests 
by building up military capabilities and forming alliances; the 
main constraint on their behaviour is the material balance of 
power. Constructivism, by contrast, sees identity as shaping in-
terests and norms that determine what behaviour states see as 
appropriate. States’ identities are constructed such that contests, 
both domestic and regional, over appropriate identities and de-
rivative norms are regular occurrences. Differing norms in turn 
shape different kinds of anarchy, whose impact on Middle East 
states shape quite different propensities to conflict or coopera-
tion (Wendt 1992). 
Grasping the complexity of Middle East international rela-
tions requires combining realist and constructivist narratives. 
The most obvious reason for this is that the international rela-
tions of the Middle East embody, as realists would predict, a 
struggle for power. The Middle East is the world region with the 
highest level of militarisation. Only here does state-to-state war 
remain a regular occurrence; civil wars, proxy wars and rebel-
lion are also endemic, creating high insecurity. Additionally, 
however, this is the region where contests between rival identi-
ties play the largest role in the power struggle, such that (as con-
structivists argue) identities are key drivers, constraints, and 
tools in that struggle. The power struggle is shaped by the inter-
action between agents that promote identities and systemic 
structure, mostly material, that constrains (or, alternatively, em-
powers) these; yet, further requiring a synthesis between realist 
and constructivist approaches, both agency and structure have 
interlinked material and ideational components. The inter-rela-
tion of the material and ideational can be seen in three aspects 
of regional international relations:
Identity, interest and insecurity. Agency in the regional pow-
er struggle refers chiefly to state actors (but also to certain trans-
state actors, especially insofar as they acquire attributes of state-
hood, e.g. Hizbollah) which are locked in power competitions 
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in which identity plays a pivotal role. State leaders have an inter-
est in constructing identities that will legitimise their rule and 
enhance their competitive position in regional politics. In inter-
state power struggles, states’ identities shape how they see their 
interests (and thus threats to those interests). If I identify myself 
as an Arab leader, I am likely to see it as in my interest to defend 
Arab causes against the West and Israel; if I identify as a Sunni 
threatened by Shia Iran, I may ally with the West/Israel in order 
to balance against Iran. Identity and interests mutually feedback 
on each other, but, as a rule, in a high-insecurity anarchic sys-
tem security (survival) imperatives usually take priority. More 
than that, in an anarchic regional system, state identity is typi-
cally shaped by insecurity, constructed against an “Other” – a 
different ethnic or religious identity or (usually) a neighbouring 
state (given how proximity elevates threat perception and how 
borders are often in dispute).
The two sides of power. To be effective, agents must deploy 
both material and ideational power. States need a well-rounded 
combination of material power assets, but to prevail in region-
al power struggles, they also need soft power, and they must be 
internally consolidated: and, crucially, enjoy legitimacy, the bed-
rock of which is a cohesive (national) identity congruent with 
territory that enables states to count on the loyalties of their 
populations. Weak and, especially, failing states that lack such 
assets present power vacuums that make them the targets of 
stronger states, particularly in proxy wars in which identities 
and material means (arms, money) are combined.
Agent and structure. Agents’ actions are constrained by “an-
archic” systemic structures. As traditionally conceptualised by 
realism, structure is predominantly constituted by the distribu-
tion of material power (state capabilities). But it is also made 
up of regional norms, which regimes can ignore only at risk to 
their legitimacy, and which they can promote or use against each 
other. And, as Wendt (1992) points out, structure is not uniform 
or fixed: rather, states’ behaviour affects the kind of anarchy 
produced. This can vary considerably depending on the norms 
promoted in inter-state power struggles – from Lockean ver-
sions, in which rivals acknowledge each other’s vital interests 
and cooperation is therefore possible, to Hobbesian ones, in 
which an unrestrained struggle for power is the norm. For real-
ism, it is hegemonic states possessing preponderant hard and 
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soft power that are best able to impose “regimes” – rules of the 
game – that shape normative variations in anarchy. Yet in a 
multipolar system, other states will tend to combine in order to 
prevent such hegemony. If a dominant normative order is ne-
vertheless established, its stability depends on a congruence of 
material structure and legitimating norms; but to the extent that 
these are incongruent or that hegemonic power declines, revi-
sionist movements or states will challenge the status quo.
The Middle East regional system: a states- 
system embedded in supra-state communities
This material–ideational duality is nowhere more manifest than 
in the Middle East regional system. The Middle East inter-state 
system is embedded in trans-/supra-state identity communities; 
thus both of the largely “material” features of the inter-state sys-
tem – state capabilities and the balance of power – interact with 
the dynamics of identity.
The Middle East regional inter-state system is inherently 
semi-Westphalian: that is, it is a multipolar system defined by 
largely material balances of power among semi-sovereign states 
that engage in balancing against security threats, these being 
perceived predominantly as emanating from neighbours, par-
ticularly if territory is in dispute between them. Balancing main-
ly takes the form of self-help through building up military de-
terrent capabilities, but can also involve joining alliances against 
shared threats. Balancing tends to foster a security dilemma: as 
all states seek to increase their capabilities, all become less se-
cure. The main basis of order in the system is (as realism pre-
dicts) either the balance of power congruent with the norm of 
sovereignty, or a “regime” imposed by a hegemonic power. In the 
Middle East, stronger states have regularly sought hegemony, 
while other states have tended to combine in order to balance 
and blunt such bids. The weakest states – mini-states lacking 
military capacity – have sought security either by appeasing (or 
“bandwagoning” with) stronger regional states or by “omni-bal-
ancing” – allying with a protective patron at the global level.
What makes the Middle East states-system distinctive is that 
it is embedded in an exceptionally potent trans-/supra-state 
public space or community defined by the ingredients of com-
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mon identity, namely the Arabic language and the Islamic reli-
gion. Within this public space there are ongoing struggles over 
norms, foreign policy roles and regime legitimacy. These are 
conducted by means of discourse wars. Trans-state identities are 
widely instrumentalised in inter-state power struggles, since re-
gional states are exceptionally permeable to trans-state media, 
networks and movements (Lynch 1999; Barnett 1993; Salloukh, 
et. al. 2004). 
This situation originates in the formation of the regional sys-
tem: specifically, in the historical imposition by Western impe-
rialism of a Westphalian-like system of territorial states in the 
Middle East region in a manner that paid little attention to iden-
tity and thus fragmented what had formerly been a single large 
political space constructed over centuries by successive Muslim 
empires with a shared culture, indeed with all the ingredients of 
nationhood. In this process, often-arbitrary borders cut across 
existing sub- and supra-state identities, creating territorial states, 
but not nation-states with identities sharply differentiating them 
from their neighbours (Kienle 1990, 15–35). Thus the loyalties of 
populations were divided between supra-state and sub-state 
identities, with the result that individual states have never been 
able to count on their unreserved loyalty, as sub-/trans- or su-
pra-state identities are often promoted against the state elite by 
opposition groups. Most states were therefore “born” already 
suffering from some degree of legitimacy deficit. Consequently 
most states feel some threat from their own populations, such 
that threats to regime security from within are often govern-
ments’ most immediate priority (Gause 2003/2004). Further, 
these threats often take the form of subversion by rival states 
wielding trans-state identity discourses aimed at internal legit-
imacy (David 1991; Gause 2003/2004), in which case the main 
defence is also soft power – the construction of opposing iden-
tities (enmities) against the threat.
It is important to note, however, that the power of sub-/
trans-state identities is inversely related to the strength of states. 
Over time, variation in state strength in the region has described 
a bell-shaped curve. In the post-independence years, states were 
weak and highly permeable to trans-state movements and dis-
courses, notably in the 1956–67 pan-Arab period. As state for-
mation advanced in the 1970s and 1980s, in good part owing to 
the new availability of rent (from the oil boom) for co-opting 
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populations and financing the formation of large armies able to 
harden borders, states came to be less threatened by trans-state 
subversion, and more by their neighbours’ armies. In the peri-
od 1975–90 the system appeared to be moving towards a classi-
cal realist system of material (military) power-balancing. How-
ever, this peaked as, after the late 1980s, economic crisis weak-
ened states’ co-optative and repressive capacities and in parallel 
they became more permeable to subversion via trans-state iden-
tities. State decline reached a nadir in the slew of state failures 
resulting from the Arab Uprisings. These opened states up both 
to the overt manipulation of identities such as sectarianism and 
the conduct on their soil of proxy wars by rival external powers.
As a result of the regional system’s distinctive formation – 
that is, the incongruence between material (states and their bor-
ders) and normative (identity) factors – instability is built into 
its very fabric, manifest in the unusual incidence in the region 
of revisionist states. At the state level, where state territory and 
identity are frequently incongruent, irredentist and revisionist 
impulses drive states in powerful “pan” movements to reunite 
individual states in a larger community, or alternatively, where 
these cut across sub-/trans-state identities, to rework borders. 
Incongruence has also empowered more powerful states to use 
trans-state identities to interfere in the politics of other region-
al states. Indeed, the Middle East is arguably distinctive in that 
the region is perceived as a single political space, such that am-
bitious states regularly bid for regional hegemony in the name 
of a supra-state identity – historically either Arabism or Islam – 
and, often to this end, back sub- or trans-state opposition move-
ments in rival regional states (Harkness and Van den Berg 1997).
Being seen to act on behalf of dominant regional norms is 
normally a requisite for the hegemonic bids of ambitious states. 
Thus would-be Middle East hegemons regularly challenge the 
multipolar distribution of power in the name of a supra-state 
identity. Nasser’s Egypt made the most successful bid for hege-
mony, in the name of pan-Arabism, establishing a normative 
pan-Arab “regime” that lasted over a decade. Iran made a bid 
for hegemony framed in pan-Islamic terms after its revolution, 
and Saddam Hussein tried to assume the dropped banner of 
pan-Arab leadership from Egypt after Nasser. Most recently, 
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have made bids for region-wide lead-
ership in the name of a largely Sunni-framed Islamic identity. 
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However, such ambitions regularly provoke counter-balancing 
by coalitions of status quo powers in the name of sovereignty or 
a rival supra-state identity. This dynamic of a multipolar system 
has operated to ensure that no aspirant hegemon has been able 
to sustain hegemony beyond limited periods (Hinnebusch 
2013). Ultimately the multipolar material balance is so intract-
able that such efforts are frustrated and the norm of sovereign-
ty is reasserted. Bids for hegemony are dependent on how far a 
state can deploy a combination of material resources (such as a 
large population, army or oil) together with a historical identi-
ty congruent with the state’s borders, such that it is relatively im-
pervious to trans-state penetration and can hence instrumen-
talise a supra-state identity against others at minimal risk to it-
self (Egypt, Iran). Conversely, the most likely victims of the re-
gion’s frequent identity wars are “artificially created” identity-
fragmented states, readily subverted from without and lacking 
material resources. Historically these have included Lebanon, 
Yemen, Jordan, and now Syria.
Finally, the “anarchy” of the Middle East states-system 
varies from a relatively benign “Lockean” form that does not 
exclude inter-state cooperation to more Hobbesian, conflict-
ridden forms. These variations depend, to a great extent, on 
identity and norms: on whether shared norms constrain aggres-
sion, and whether states construct their identity in opposition to 
the other (hence shaping notions of enmity), or else share an 
identity (Arab or Muslim) as a basis for amity. In the Middle 
East (Buzan and Waever 2003), enmity has historically been as-
sociated with the ethnic fault lines between the Arab and non-
Arab states (Iran, Israel) – but largely to the extent that these co-
incide with struggles over tangibles, particularly territory in-
volving disputed borders or irredentism. For some decades the 
threat from the non-Arab peripheries was compatible with the 
construction of a relatively Lockean order in the Arab core of the 
system, especially when the Egyptian hegemon was enforcing 
pan-Arab norms which confined the most egregious Hobbesian 
practices (notably war) to the fault lines between Arab and non-
Arab actors in the system. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was, 
however, indicative of a penetration of Hobbesian practices to 
the Arab core of the regional system. Since then, with the rise of 
sectarianism that has cut across ethnic fault lines and has divid-
ed the region into Sunni and Shia, Hobbesian practices, notably 
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proxy wars, have thoroughly permeated much of the regional 
system. Multi-sectarian states such as those in the Levant and 
Yemen are now the epicentres of such enmity. The regional sys-
tem provides the context within which the contemporary sectar-
ian surge was unleashed – and, to an extent, has now receded.
The variability of identity:  
the road to sectarianisation
Identity has thus always mattered for Middle East regional pol-
itics, but not in a straightforward way, since there are multiple, 
often competing, identities in play (Patel 2010, 136): at the sub-/
trans-state level (where communal minorities and tribes are of-
ten scattered across borders), the state level (when the state is 
seen by its citizens as representing the political community, le-
gitimised by the norm of sovereignty), and the supra-state level 
(embracing many states via pan-Arabism, pan-Islam and, with-
in the latter, sectarian trans-state Sunni and Shia identities). 
None of these identities can be said to be hegemonic, and iden-
tifications with the individual Middle East states, with Arabism 
and with Islam have, over time, each normally claimed the pri-
mary loyalty of about one-third of the Arab populations. There 
was, however, some variation as to which was dominant in a par-
ticular period.1 Until 2011, the identities instrumentalised in in-
ter-state rivalry were relatively inclusive pan-Arab or pan- 
Islamic identities. Pan-Arabism, nearly hegemonic from the 
1940s to the 1970s, thereafter declined, and especially with the 
Iranian revolution, Islam became dominant. Political Islam, 
while in some ways as inclusive as Arabism in promoting reli-
gious identity as the basis of regional normative order (unlike 
pan-Arabism, it also includes non-Arab Turkey and Iran), ne-
vertheless opened the door to conflict over the “true” Islam, in 
other words, to the potential for sectarianisation (Rubin 2014).
However, Sunni–Shia sectarianism had not played a major 
regional role since the instrumentalisation of these differences 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries under Ottoman–
Safavid rivalry, and for long periods the main line of movement 
was towards ecumenical coexistence. The main promoter of 
Sunni sectarianism, Saudi-fostered Wahhabism, was for long pe-
riods a marginal movement, contested by secular Arabism and 
1. See the surveys of identity by 
Shibley Telhami’s yearly Arab public 
Opinion polls undertaken with 
Zogby international: brookings.edu/
research/2010-arab-public-opinion-
poll-results-of-arab-opinion-survey-
conducted-june-29-july-20–2010/
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by moderate or modernist versions of Islam. Sectarianism had 
little resonance in the more identity-homogeneous societies of 
the region, and while it has always been a feature of the multi-
sectarian Levant, sectarian identities there were often unpoliti-
cised, “private” identity markers, or were overshadowed by more 
inclusive identities that were therefore compatible with sectari-
an coexistence. In a few multi-sectarian states, in certain peri-
ods at least, sectarian identities had been politicised and instru-
mentalised by political entrepreneurs in order to mobilise sup-
port and/or empower groups competing for power or resour-
ces. Such practices, however, not being founded in religious doc-
trine, lent themselves to compromise by adjusting shares among 
the contenders, and accordingly were often carried on without 
violent conflict. Most overt in Lebanon, sectarianism in Syria 
and Iraq also served to an extent as assabiyeh – a mechanism of 
solidarity binding groups that were struggling for power or over 
ideology – but this remained covert, because it lacked legitima-
cy in the public sphere. During the Iran–Iraq war, the overt 
identities in contestation were Iraq’s secular Arab nationalism 
(with Iran depicted as the Persian enemy) versus Iran’s revolu-
tionary pan-Islam. Here the Sunni versus Shia cleavage was la-
tent, but not overtly instrumentalised by either side, since this 
would have weakened both: it could have fragmented Iraq in-
ternally, as well as degrading Iran’s claim to lead all Muslims.
What is distinctive about the current period is that the Sun-
ni–Shia dichotomy is increasingly taking the overt and explicit 
form of what might be called “militant” or high-intensity sectar-
ianism. Militant sectarianism seeks to impose, if need be by 
force, a single true interpretation of Islam in the public sphere. 
It demonises those who do not comply as infidels, embraces 
martyrdom for the cause, and promotes public religious visions 
that cannot readily be compromised (Brubaker 2015). Militant 
sectarianism tends to be trans-state, operating across state 
boundaries; it flourishes in contexts of intense power struggles 
and insecurity, and particularly in societies that are sharply po-
larised by sectarian cleavages with little by way of cross-cutting 
cleavages to dilute them. It tends to provoke a defensive militan-
cy in communities that are threatened as apostates or heretics 
(Malmvig 2012). At the inter-state level, it may be largely instru-
mentalised in the pursuit of material goals such as security or 
power, but its effect is to harden lines of enmity and amity be-
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tween states into a “we” and “they” that may come to shape the 
actual identity of the actors.
How did this militant sectarianism become such a salient 
identity? A major igniting spark was the US invasion of Iraq, 
which set off a Sunni–Shia civil war in the country that spilled 
over into sectarian enmity all across the region. This was inten-
sified by Saudi Arabia and Iran’s instrumentalisation of sectari-
anism in their own regional power struggles, which escalated 
following Saudi alarm at the empowering of the Iraqi Shia – and 
thus of Iran – brought about by the overthrow of the Saddam 
regime. Then, after 2010, the civil wars unleashed by the Arab 
Uprisings in several failing states propelled the spread of Salafist 
fundamentalism, which readily slipped into jihadism. As jihad-
ism proliferated amid violent conflict, other previously majori-
ty non-violent versions of Sunnism that had accepted coexist-
ence with other religions and versions of Islam were weakened. 
This included Sufis, whose “sectarianism” tends to be non-polit-
ical and accommodationist with secular authorities and other 
religions; but it also included even the modernist political Islam 
of the Muslim Brotherhood brand, which, squeezed, notably in 
Syria, between regime repression and jihadi takfiri mobilisation, 
struggled to sustain its modernist discourse of a fairly inclusive 
civil state. In parallel with this, Sunni jihadism also stimulated 
more militant versions of Shia sectarian consciousness, notably 
in the phenomenon of Shia militias in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
The historical variation in the region’s dominant supra-state 
identities resulted in quite different consequences for the states-
system. Arabism tended to be unifying, both within states and 
in the regional public space, and at least until Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990, it had placed some normative constraints on the 
power struggle between Arab states over its leadership and prop-
er interpretation. By contrast, contemporary radical sectarian-
ism prescribes an uncompromising and violent jihad within the 
Islamic umma against “false” religions and their state backers. It 
has promoted a Sunni–Shia bipolarisation of the region, in 
which all peoples and states are pushed to take sides and among 
whom compromise is difficult. It has generated a shift from a 
relatively benign Lockean to a Hobbesian system of intense en-
mity, in parallel with a move from discourse wars to violent 
proxy wars that tear societies apart. In this process, rival states 
have used sectarianism to introduce cleavages into target soci-
Raymond Hinnebusch · The Sectarian Surge in the Middle East ...
Tidsskrift for Islamforskning  13 (1) · 2019 · 35-61
46
eties; while multi-sectarian societies suffering from some degree 
of state failure have become highly permeable to penetration by 
sectarian discourse, networks and movements.
The sectarianisation of the regional power  
struggle and its consequences: from sectarian 
agency to structural constraint
The post-Arab Uprisings regional struggle for power was not 
initially chiefly sectarian in character, yet the dynamic of the re-
gional power struggle was decisive in soon empowering sectar-
ianising agents that bifurcated the regional power system along 
identity lines. However, the structure of the states-system, in 
which rival states pursued interests and balanced against threats, 
ultimately restored the old realist rules of the multipolar game. 
The following section traces out the phases and watersheds in 
the rise of sectarianism and its interrelation with the regional 
power struggle.
Regional bifurcation in the 2000s
The sectarianisation of regional politics was initiated by the US 
invasion of Iraq. The invasion generated alignments that bifur-
cated the regional system of the 2000s into two rival camps, 
framed as the pro-Western “moderate” Sunni bloc (Saudi Ara-
bia, Egypt, Jordan) and the resistance axis (Iran, Syria, Hizbol-
lah, Hamas), dubbed the “Shia Crescent” by its opponents (Val-
bjørn and Banks 2011). The two camps fought for influence in 
sectarian-divided Lebanon and Iraq, and took sides over Israel’s 
wars against Hizbollah and Gaza. In the regional discourse wars, 
the resistance camp gained the upper hand by portraying its ri-
vals as pushed by their alliances with the United States to betray 
the Arab cause and side with Israel in the latter’s wars in Leba-
non and Gaza. The moderate bloc, its legitimacy damaged so 
long as the dominant identity was Arab–Islamic nationalism, 
fought back by portraying the issue as interference by Shia Iran 
in the Arab world against Sunnis. In the Arab street, however, 
this instrumentalisation of sectarianism at the state level initial-
ly acquired only limited resonance. Here the main enemy was 
seen as Israel, rather than Iran; for the Sunni masses, the non-
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Sunni Muslim leaders of the resistance axis – Hizbollah’s Hasan 
Nasrallah, Syria’s Asad and Iranian president Ahmadinejad – 
were popular heroes in that they effectively combined Arab na-
tionalist and Islamist discourses in a struggle against Israel and 
the United States (Valbjørn and Banks 2011). Nevertheless the 
invasion of Iraq was, at the same time, preparing the way for 
deeper sectarianisation. It unleashed a sectarian civil war that 
soon spilled over regionally, polarising the discourse in the more 
Islamist parts of the regional public sphere. In bringing Shia 
movements to power in Iraq at Sunni expense, the aftermath of 
the invasion seemed to empower Iran. This particularly alarmed 
Saudi Arabia, which redoubled its instrumentalisation of Sunni 
sectarian discourse against Iranian involvement in the Arab 
world. This “New Arab Cold War” (although the players were 
no longer only Arab, at stake was dominance in the Arab world) 
was still largely fought via media (not yet proxy) wars. It did not 
destabilise any of the rival regimes, which appeared able to con-
tain trans-state activism, except for Iraq, where the US destruc-
tion of the state apparatus had unleashed near-sectarian civil 
war, and, to a lesser degree, Lebanon, where a low-intensity 
struggle paralysed a weak government.
Meanwhile a new actor had entered on the regional stage, 
initially, at least, to the advantage of the resistance axis. Turkey’s 
ruling party, the AKP, and its leader Tayyip Recip Erdoğan re-
versed the tendency of secular Ataturkist governments to eschew 
involvement in the Arab world (except insofar as it was seen as 
a security threat). Turkey under the AKP now sought “zero pro-
blems” with its neighbours; it also seemed to entertain what was 
termed a “neo-Ottomanist” ambition to restore Turkey’s status 
as hegemon of the post-Ottoman space, including in the Middle 
East. This resulted in the erosion of the 1990s alliance that the 
Turkish military had established with Israel and against the re-
sistance axis. In the 2000s, by contrast, Turkey established a close 
alliance with Syria and posed as champion of the Palestine cause 
against Israel, both moves that were congruent with its new am-
bition for regional leadership. Turkey now moved into closer 
alignment with the resistance axis than the pro-Western camp.
In this period, therefore, the instrumentalisation of sectari-
anism was beginning, but was contained by nationalist counter-
narratives that in the context of the time, including the struggle 
with Israel, were more persuasive than sectarianism at the grass-
roots level.
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The early post-Uprising regional struggle (2011–2013)
The post-Arab Uprisings regional power struggle initially ap-
peared to be a continuation of the “New Arab Cold War”: the 
contending blocs were similar, the struggle still essentially over 
legitimacy. Yet the immediate issues at stake were now less those 
of relations with the West and Israel than the threats and oppor-
tunities issuing from the revolt against authoritarian regimes. 
The blocs had also been somewhat reconfigured, insofar as the 
Uprisings that debilitated foreign policy agency in Egypt and 
Syria (against the background of the prior debilitation of Iraq 
by the US invasion) knocked these historic powers of the Arab 
core out of the power game, leaving a vacuum that Turkey, Iran, 
and Saudi Arabia – the powers on the regional periphery – com-
peted to fill. For this reason, this period might be better framed 
as a Middle East Cold War, even though the battleground was 
still chiefly the Arab world. Each of these “periphery powers” had 
enough power resources, internal coherence and immunity to 
the Uprising to be able to instrumentalise trans-state legitima-
cy discourses at reasonable risk. The main battlegrounds were 
the states that experienced the Uprisings; and the prospect of 
the moderate bloc losing Egypt and the resistance axis losing 
Syria made the competition to influence their trajectories pivo-
tal to the power struggle. By comparison with the New Arab 
Cold War of the 2000s, the means employed now took the more 
intrusive form of “competitive interference”. Rival contenders 
sought to bring to power (or prevent the fall of) friendly forces 
inside Uprising states and hence to expand (or protect) their 
spheres of influence.
What was most different, however, in this round of the New 
Arab/Middle East Cold War was that the resistance axis lost the 
upper hand it had enjoyed in the 2000s. The dominant early dis-
course of demands for democracy and freedom in the Arab 
countries served to marginalise the traditional pan-Arab, anti-
imperialist, anti-Zionist concerns on the back of which the re-
sistance axis had risen (Rahim 2011; Tamlali 2011). The eclipse 
of Arab nationalism left an ideological vacuum that Islamism 
seemed initially to effectively fill. In parallel, the weakening of 
the largely secular Arab republics potentially empowered not 
only trans-state Islamist movements, but also the Arab monar-
chies that promoted Islamism, notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
The Arab satellite media expressed the agendas of these monar-
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chies, spreading discourse (whether “democratic” or Islamist) 
that was intended to undermine the authoritarian republics 
(Hijjawi 2011). The decline of secular ideologies and the rise of 
religious discourses, while not identical with sectarianisation, 
was a prerequisite for it.
Although Islamism appeared to benefit from the Uprisings, 
this was not uniformly so of its various rival variants. In particu-
lar, the anti-imperialist Islamic movements, notably Hamas and 
Hizbollah, were weakened. Hizbollah’s and Iran’s support for the 
Asad regime damaged their previous high standing in public 
opinion and made them vulnerable to accusations they followed 
a Shia sectarian agenda (Mohns and Bank  2012). Popular per-
ceptions changed dramatically. In 2006, 75% of Arabs had ap-
proved of Iran, including 85% of Saudis, but by 2012 Iran’s ap-
proval ratings had plummeted to less than 25%, and in Saudi 
Arabia, to less than 15% (Zogby 2013). The main initial benefi-
ciary of Islamism’s empowerment was the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Its organised branches in most Arab states, with their extensive 
charitable and educational networks, seemed poised to rise to 
power on the back of democratic transition in authoritarian re-
gimes, most notably in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco; it also be-
nefited from the patronage of Turkey and Qatar, which viewed 
it as a vehicle for their regional influence. In parallel, Saudi Ara-
bia, other Gulf states and rich individuals funded Salafists en-
tering the political arena, partly as tools of Saudi influence, no-
tably in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria (Haddadi 2011). The rise of 
Sunni Islamist parties and the debilitation of Hizbollah’s Arab 
nationalist discourse, seeming to expose it as a “Shia” movement 
fighting Sunni protestors in Syria, began to arouse sectarian 
consciousness in the Arab public sphere.
In parallel to this ideological transnational shift away from 
traditional Arab nationalism, at the inter-state level a similar tilt 
occurred in the balance of power in favour of Turkey and the 
GCC (the Gulf Cooperation Council of the Arab countries). The 
monarchies proved more resilient than the republics in damp-
ening the domestic threat posed by the Uprisings, using a com-
bination of repression (most obvious in Bahrain), political con-
cession (most obvious in Morocco), and economic blandish-
ments to citizens (most obvious in Saudi Arabia, where $97 bil-
lion worth of jobs and benefits were promised, the equivalent of 
$5,000 per citizen). The GCC was upgraded into a “Holy Alli-
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ance” to contain the democratic threat, with the richer monar-
chies transferring billions to the poorer (Morocco, Jordan, 
Oman and Bahrain) and using petrodollars to promote Salafism, 
for instance against democratic youth in Egypt. The GCC also 
took advantage of the Uprising to weaken and undermine the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian republics. It used the pan-Arab 
media and the Arab League to legitimise Western intervention 
against Qaddafi, an old monarchic foe, and tried to do the same 
with Asad’s Syria. As the Arab Uprising began, Turkey (after an 
early misstep when it appeared to oppose the Uprising in Lib-
ya) seemed to successfully promote its own soft power as an Is-
lamic democracy with economic prowess, and hence its status 
as a successful model to replace the authoritarian regimes threat-
ened by the Arab Uprising. Erdoğan was welcomed as a big 
brother and inspiration in Egypt and Tunisia, where – briefly – 
the AKP’s ideological kin, the Muslim Brothers, held power. In 
general, the rise of Islamism at the expense of secular national-
ism at all levels – states, social movements, and publics – pre-
pared the way for sectarianism, since, even though the two were 
not identical, once religion is politicized the door is open to po-
litical conflicts over its proper interpretation i.e. over heresy, 
apostasy, etc. 
Also preparing the way for sectarianization of the regional 
power struggle was the fact that the two main sites of the region-
al power struggle were sectarian-divided societies and specifi-
cally in the two states in which each rival bloc was most vulner-
able: Bahrain and Syria. Bahrain was where the monarchy-led 
pro-Western bloc was most vulnerable, ruled as it was by a Sun-
ni monarchy that discriminated against the large Shia majority. 
Having “lost” Iraq to Shia power as a result of the US invasion, 
the Sunni Gulf monarchies feared that Iran would benefit fur-
ther from Shia empowerment in Bahrain. The GCC’s military 
intervention and escalating repression checked the Bahraini Up-
rising and inflamed Sunni–Shia tensions in the Gulf, to the 
benefit of the Sunni monarchies (Mathiesen 2013).
Syria, on the other hand, was the weak spot of the resistance 
axis. The Uprising turned it into a battleground, pitting Iran 
against Turkey and the GCC, which saw an opportunity to break 
the resistance axis. Qatar’s Al-Jazeera TV encouraged the Up-
rising, and Saudi Arabia financed anti-regime tribes and Islam-
ist factions. Turkey’s Erdoğan turned against his former ally, 
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Bashar al-Asad, objecting to the violence with which pro-de-
mocracy protestors were repressed and urging that he share 
power with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. When Erdoğan was 
rebuffed, Turkey gave safe haven and support to exiled Syrian 
opposition politicians, and helped to train and back the “Free 
Syrian Army” that contested Asad militarily. Meanwhile, with 
the debilitating of the republics, the GCC assumed the leader-
ship of the Arab League, where Qatar engineered the suspen-
sion of Syria’s membership and economic sanctions against it, 
amid calls for the internationalisation of the crisis. When Rus-
sia and China blocked internationalisation at the UN Security 
Council, the GCC states and Turkey turned to funding and arm-
ing insurgents, contributing to the militarisation of what was 
becoming a Syrian civil war with sectarian undertones. The 
most effective insurgents quickly proved to be, not Asad’s secu-
lar opponents, but Islamists; and the more jihadist they were, 
the greater their fighting prowess. This and ideological affinity 
with Gulf (often private) funders resulted in the bulk of exter-
nal anti-Asad funding being channelled to jihadists such as Ah-
rar al-Sham and an al-Qaida offshoot, Jabhat al-Nusra (Abboud 
2015). On the defensive, Iran sought to create a corridor con-
necting Iranian territory to Syria and the Lebanese coast via Iraq 
(where, in the wake of the US withdrawal, the Maliki regime’s 
repression of its Sunni rivals had made it increasingly depend-
ent on Iran), allowing Tehran to supply Hizbollah and provid-
ing the Asad regime with a two-sided buffer that could help it 
survive (Goodarzi 2011). Thus Syria was becoming the incuba-
tor of what would quickly turn into a sectarian polarisation of 
the region.
Sectarian proxy wars amid state failure: from  
instrumentalisation to grassroots sectarianisation 
(2013–15)
In this middle Arab Uprising period, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qa-
tar and Iran all deepened their competitive intervention, with 
arms, money and fighters sent to governments and insurgents 
in the identity-fragmented and failing states – above all in Syr-
ia, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. Crucially, each regional power in-
creasingly instrumentalised sectarianism in their discourse and 
in their choice of proxies in the intervention.
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The strategies of the main rival states differed, with conse-
quences accordingly for sectarianisation. Saudi Arabia framed 
Iran as Shia, heretical, and non-Arab, hence as not entitled to in-
volvement in inter-Arab politics. It sought thereby to mobilise the 
demographically superior Sunnis (85% across the region) on its 
side. Iran, on the other hand, heading the minority Shia camp, 
initially sought to portray itself as a pan-Islamic leader of resist-
ance against US and Zionist imperialism, a construction where-
in it would have the advantage over US-aligned Saudi Arabia. As, 
however, sectarianism deepened and as the appeal of this stance 
declined, Iran took up the role of defender of minorities against 
Sunni takfiris. Iran therefore sought to compensate for Shia de-
mographic inferiority by means of more mobilised, unified Shia 
sectarian networks, at the same time taking advantage of what 
soon became greater divisions within the Sunni camp (Byman 
2014).
The instrumentalisation of sectarianism was a continuation 
of the struggle of the 2000s, but what had changed was the Arab 
street. Hitherto relatively immune to sectarianism, now public 
opinion was mobilised by it – especially in the failing states, but 
also regionally, where for example sections of publics in states 
with small Shia populations came to view them with suspicion, 
if not actually as enemies. A vicious cycle set in between sectar-
ianism and state failure. The existential struggle for power amid 
civil wars in the failing states incentivised both regimes and op-
position to instrumentalise sectarianism in order to rally sup-
porters and demonise opponents. This sectarian discourse pre-
cipitated unprecedentedly high levels of armed mobilisation, 
and exceptional levels of violence in several states wracked by 
civil war. These developments, above all in Syria and Iraq, also 
occurred to a lesser degree in Yemen. In Syria, Bashar al-Asad 
responded to the protests that were threatening to overwhelm 
his regime by characterising the opposition as Sunni jihadists to 
rally his base among the minorities. At the same time, Al-Qai-
da’s various avatars instrumentalised sectarianism in its oppo-
sition to several regimes. In Iraq, for example, Zarqawi’s Al-Qai-
da and its ISIS successor deliberately sought to provoke sectar-
ian war by attacking Shia mosques, in the belief that this would 
force all Sunnis to rally around the jihadist leadership (Matthies-
en 2015a). As states lost the capacity to maintain order, sectari-
anism seeped downward to the grassroots, activating the secu-
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rity dilemma, so that ordinary people were forced to fall back 
on their primordial communities for protection amid fears of 
sectarian “cleansing” and massacres as exemplified in Syria and 
Iraq (Posen 1993). Jihad and martyrdom were embraced, as nor-
mal life gave way to a war economy in which sectarian warlords 
provided the means of survival; the most motivated fighters, 
fired by sectarian zeal and hatred, attracted the greatest external 
funding. Amid high levels of violence, radical sectarian voices, 
whether in social media or among armed factions on the ground, 
tended to marginalise those in the middle, whether these were 
non-sectarian secularists or moderate Sunnis.
As the curve of state formation reached its nadir in a slew of 
failed states, armed non-state/trans-state movements with a sec-
tarian or ethnic character became empowered in an unprece-
dented way; not only were they becoming autonomous actors 
within states, breaking states’ monopoly of legitimate violence, 
but they were also challenging their borders and sovereignty 
(Stanfield 2013). What had been two key Arab nationalist pow-
ers, Iraq and Syria, became, with the Arab Uprising, an intercon-
nected field of sectarian contestation across which trans-state 
sectarianised groups moved back and forth as the power strug-
gle dictated. State borders and ruling regimes (of the other sect) 
were contested in an utterly unprecedented way. Sunni fighters 
from across the region and beyond swarmed into Syria to fight 
the apostate regime that was killing Sunnis; in reaction, Iran mo-
bilised Iraqi and Afghan Shia militias (Knights 2012; Tamimi 
2015). The collapse of Syrian and Iraqi state control over their 
territories allowed the ISIS movement to seize control over wide 
areas of western Iraq and eastern Syria, declaring the abolition 
of the Syrian–Iraqi border as part of the construction of a trans-
national “caliphate” that framed the Shia as the main immediate 
enemy. At the states-system level, sectarianism precipitated a bi-
polarisation of state alignments: all states were under normative 
pressure to take sides along sectarian lines.
Intra-sectarian contestation and the re-shifting of  
the regional power balance (2015–18)
If the main axes in the early Uprising years had by 2013 taken on 
a sectarian Sunni–Shia bipolarisation, this was soon diluted by 
growing fragmentation in the “Sunni” camp at both state and 
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non-state levels. This resulted from inter-Sunni rivalry and the 
overreach of several Sunni state actors.
First, inside the failing states, intra-Sunni contestation be-
gan, in which the radicals tended to squeeze out the moderates. 
Thus in the Syrian civil war the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and 
the “Free Syrian Army” were marginalised by jihadists who then 
embarked on internecine battles. Rival jihadist movements such 
as Ahrar as-Sham battled for supremacy with Jabhat an-Nusra, 
as did the latter with ISIS, despite their similar ideologies.
Second, three years after the Uprising, Turkey’s bid for re-
gional hegemony on moderate Islamist grounds had run 
aground on the rocks of the Syrian conflict. Erdoğan had envis-
aged installing a client Muslim Brotherhood-run Islamist de-
mocracy in Damascus, but he grossly underestimated the tena-
city of the Asad regime, bolstered by its allies, Iran, Hizbollah 
and Russia. By 2014, Turkey appeared impotent even to manage 
the spillover from the Syrian crisis – refugee flows, Kurdish em-
powerment – on its borders. In deploying Sunni Islamic identi-
ty and backing the jihadists against Asad, Ankara had contrib-
uted to the radical sectarianisation that was destabilising the re-
gion. Indeed its tolerance, if not encouragement of ISIS pro-
voked blowback against it once ISIS turned against Turkey. Tur-
key was also soon on bad terms with other Sunni states after ob-
jecting to the Saudi/UAE-backed military overthrow of Presi-
dent Morsi in Egypt and to Egypt’s subsequent moves to isolate 
Hamas in Gaza. When the Muslim Brotherhood had seemed to 
be mounting to power regionally, Turkey’s “no problems” strat-
egy towards its neighbours and stance as a democratic Islamist 
hegemon in the Arab world had given it considerable reserves 
of soft power; but its regional position was debilitated by the 
marginalisation of the Brothers by both secularist and jihadist 
opponents, by the backlash against Turkish sponsorship of Sun-
ni jihadists in Syria (notably the United States’ co-optation of 
the Syrian Kurds against ISIS), and by Ankara’s involvement in 
protracted warfare against the Kurds. Turkey’s military inter-
vention, on the other hand, had carved out a Turkish sphere of 
influence in northern Syria but also further embroiled it as a 
partisan in the Syrian conflict.
In parallel, Saudi Arabia under its new King Salman and his 
son had ambitions to make Riyadh a more muscular power ca-
pable of counter-balancing Iran. It relied on its wealth to co-opt 
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allies and to “buy” soft power via pan-Arab media and trans-
state educational and charity networks. While its Wahhabi ver-
sion of Salafism, once marginal, had been effectively spread by 
Saudi-financed activists since the 1970s oil boom, it had never-
theless been contained by rival versions of Islam. In the new 
world of sectarian rivalry, however, Saudi Salafism came to com-
mand greater grassroots support in the region. Also for the first 
time, the Saudis tried to add hard offensive military power to the 
equation with their intervention in Yemen. This seemed to check 
Riyadh’s rising fortunes, for not only did the intervention get 
bogged down in protracted conflict that made Yemen’s Houthis 
more dependent on Iran, but also in wreaking great damage on 
Yemen the campaign seemed likely to generate enduring ani-
mosities that would blowback against the Saudis (Reidel 2017).
At the regional system level, each of the Sunni powers was 
promoting a version of Sunni identity that corresponded to re-
gime interests, increasing against their fellow sectarians. Thus 
the affinity of the ruling AKP in Turkey with the modernist form 
of political Islam promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood and Qa-
tar’s similar support put them at odds with the Saudis and the 
UAE, which, seeing the Brotherhood as a threat to the legitima-
cy of dynastic rule, branded it a terrorist group. Regime inter-
ests also cross-cut sectarian solidarity. Regimes whose interests 
would be damaged by the pressure for sectarian bipolarisation 
resisted it, including Egypt, which did not want to see Sunni Is-
lamists empowered, and Oman, which was reluctant to antago-
nise Iran. Indeed, the al-Sisi regime in Sunni Egypt was brought 
closer to the non-Sunni Asad regime in Syria by the shared Is-
lamist threat to their secular authoritarian regimes. Qatar’s over-
sized ambitions were being cut down to size as its main surro-
gate, the Muslim Brotherhood, suffered multiple setbacks. The 
crisis of 2017 in which other GCC states sought to isolate and 
punish Doha for backing the Brotherhood and for its hedging 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia – a crisis that precipitated a 
Turkish–Qatari counter-balancing, as well as tilting both states 
towards Iran – marked another major fracture within what had 
formerly been seen as a Sunni axis against Iran. These develop-
ments underscored how far the normative power of sectarian 
identities over the foreign policies of Sunni states was being over-
ridden by regime/state interests – as realists would have predicted.
Iran recovered its position in the regional power balance, as 
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much from its rivals’ mistakes as its own successes. It mobilised 
cross-state Shia militias and demonstrated its prowess in asym-
metric warfare. For the Shia, there was no alternative regional 
leadership hence the main issue dividing them was whether Shia 
in other states such as Iraq or Lebanon would give political al-
legiance to Iran or to their own states. Those who saw Iran’s ve-
layat al-faqih as a transnational leadership had to contend with 
more “national” versions of Shiism, such as the moderate ver-
sion promoted in Iraq by Ayatollah Sistani and the politicised 
populist version of Muqtada as-Sadr in the same country. But 
all Shia were driven together by the threat from Sunni takfiris, 
who legitimised killing them, and Iranian leadership was indis-
pensable to the common defence. It was the greater solidarity of 
the Shia compared to the growing divisions among Sunnis, as 
well as the targeting of the Sunni ISIS movement by global pow-
ers, that allowed the Shia bloc to compensate for its considera-
ble demographic inferiority and, indeed, to recover the initia-
tive in the later post-Uprising power struggle. Iran’s positioning 
as the major power-broker in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, whether 
via its allies or its forces on the ground, had given, by this peri-
od, a new material reality to the “Shia Crescent”. If Iran benefit-
ed from the “under-balancing” of the Sunni states against it, as 
Gause (2016) argues, it is because the Shia–Sunni divide had be-
come increasingly cross-cut and diluted by the Islamist–secular 
and intra-Sunni cleavages, and because the different factions 
backed by Sunni states in the proxy wars had become rivals for 
power within those states. The Iranian advances provoked at-
tempts at counter-balancing by the United States under Trump, 
forcing Iran in turn into greater reliance on Russia, particular-
ly in Syria, where their interests were aligned but not identical.
Conclusion: material structure  
over sectarian agency
The sectarian surge in the Middle East was, in the first instance, 
an outcome of regional geopolitics: that is, of the interrelation 
of identity-promoting agents with the multipolar structure of 
regional politics, notably the enduring tendency for rival strong-
er states to bid for hegemony in the name of a dominant identi-
ty, and for their opponents to counter-balance against them. 
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However, this struggle was itself precipitated by an extra-sys-
temic intrusion, the US invasion of Iraq. This, in deconstructing 
the Iraqi state, inflamed sectarian civil war that spilled over into 
regional rivalries in which sectarianism was instrumentalised. 
A further string of (at least partial) state failures precipitated by 
the Arab Uprisings created further power vacuums in which 
states instrumentalised sectarianism in “competitive interfer-
ence”, by which they sought to affect outcomes in key states that 
were thought likely to affect the regional power balance, nota-
bly Syria and Bahrain.
Although instrumentalised, it does not follow that these sec-
tarian identities were artificial. On the contrary, instrumentali-
sation presupposes the prior existence of authentic, if non-po-
liticised (“everyday”) sectarian differences. But the politicisation 
and radicalisation of these identities was the outcome of region-
wide political struggles, driven by geopolitical forces that seemed 
to sectarianise identity in dramatic ways. The rise of overtly sec-
tarian jihadist movements, combined with divisive regional me-
dia discourse and internal civil wars, created an environment in 
which the grassroots of sectarian-divided societies, and even the 
rival regimes that were playing with the fire of sectarianism, 
came to perceive existential threats in the sectarian “other”.
The impact of sectarianism on the system was to destabilise 
states, further driving intervention, and to greatly intensify the 
power struggle in the regional system. In an earlier phase of iden-
tity wars, the period of Arab nationalism, actors had deployed 
media and subversion to overthrow rival governments in what 
were usually bloodless military coups. Now, by contrast, armed 
trans-state movements, often state-sponsored, were agents in vi-
olent proxy wars that enveloped whole societies along sectarian 
fault lines. If pan-Arabism had been compatible with a Lockean 
normative order, sectarianism now set the region on a transition 
to a Hobbesian system in which unlimited animosity, uncon-
strained by shared identities, started to become the norm. Al-
though the agency of sectarian actors – jihadist movements and 
instrumentalising states – was pivotal in the surge of sectarian-
ism, it was the regional structural situation – notably, failing 
states that lay open to proxy wars – that empowered them, mak-
ing sectarianism appear a winning card when it had rarely been 
seen as such before. In normative terms, sectarianism had pre-
viously been widely seen as illegitimate; now, those who failed to 
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align with their sectarian peers became the ones who had to jus-
tify themselves. Thus for a period it seemed that sectarian iden-
tity might trump individual state interests. This became mani-
fest in the Sunni–Shia bipolarisation of the region.
But sectarianism did not, in the end, manage to transform 
the regional system. The normative consequences of sectariani-
sation proved less enduring than the structural dynamic of the 
multipolar regional system, in which power-balancing “realist 
rules” came to trump “sectarian rules”. First, attempts by the 
main state rivals to use exclusivist sectarian identities to achieve 
regional hegemony provoked robust counter-balancing by those 
attached to the rival identity (in a way that had not been preor-
dained when inclusive pan-Arab or pan-Islamic identities had 
been instrumentalised by would-be hegemons largely against 
outside powers). While this counter-balancing along sectarian 
lines might have locked the region into sectarian bipolarity, in 
fact this did not endure. Rather, by greatly deepening instabili-
ty and chaos and thereby raising the level of threat perceived by 
all states, radical sectarianism amplified the tendency to self-
help in an anarchic system, so that state/regime survival inter-
ests overrode sectarian identity and fragmented the “Sunni” 
camp whose nominal “members” began balancing against each 
other. The way the whole regional and global order came to-
gether to defeat ISIS was symptomatic of the resilience of the 
multipolar system to this most radical attempt to transform it. 
Thus although structure – hegemonic rivalry – had initially em-
powered sectarian bipolarisation, in the end, as the dynamic in-
herent in the multipolar system reasserted itself, structure was 
also decisive in constraining the Middle East’s sectarian surge.
In theoretical terms, the Middle East case demonstrates that 
constructivism is essential to understanding how agents’ iden-
tities shape their interests and behaviour in the short term. In 
the long term, however, as realism argues, the material structure 
prevails.
Abstract på dansk
Denne artikel undersøger sekterismes rolle i Mellemøstens in-
ternationale relationer. Hvordan har sekterisme ændret den 
måde regional politik udspiller sig på, og hvordan har det regi-
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